We study selective monitors for labelled Markov chains. Monitors observe the outputs that are generated by a Markov chain during its run, with the goal of identifying runs as correct or faulty. A monitor is selective if it skips observations in order to reduce monitoring overhead. We are interested in monitors that minimize the expected number of observations. We establish an undecidability result for selectively monitoring general Markov chains. On the other hand, we show for non-hidden Markov chains (where any output identifies the state the Markov chain is in) that simple optimal monitors exist and can be computed efficiently, based on DFA language equivalence. These monitors do not depend on the precise transition probabilities in the Markov chain. We report on experiments where we compute these monitors for several open-source Java projects. 
Introduction
Consider an MC (Markov chain) whose transitions are labelled with letters, and a finite automaton that accepts languages of infinite words. Computing the probability that the random word emitted by the MC is accepted by the automaton is a classical problem at the heart of probabilistic verification. A finite prefix may already determine whether the random infinite word is accepted, and computing the probability that such a deciding finite prefix is produced is a nontrivial diagnosability problem. The theoretical problem we study in this paper is how to catch deciding prefixes without observing the whole prefix; i.e., we want to minimize the expected number of observations and still catch all deciding prefixes.
Motivation. In runtime verification a program sends messages to a monitor, which decides if the program run is faulty. Usually, runtime verification is turned off in production code because monitoring overhead is prohibitive. QVM (quality virtual machine) and ARV (adaptive runtime verification) are existing pragmatic solutions to the overhead problem, which perform best-effort monitoring within a specified overhead budget [1, 3] . ARV relies on RVSE (runtime verification with state estimation) to also compute a probability that the program run is faulty [21, 15] . We take the opposite approach: we ask for the smallest overhead achievable without compromising precision at all.
Experiments.
We evaluated the algorithms presented in this paper by implementing them in Facebook Infer, and trying them on 11 of the most forked Java projects on GitHub. We found that, on average, selective monitoring can reduce the number of observations to a half.
Preliminaries
Let S be a finite set. We view elements of R S as vectors, more specifically as row vectors. We write 1 for the all-1 vector, i.e., the element of {1} S . For a vector µ ∈ R S , we denote by µ T its transpose, a column vector. A vector µ ∈ [0, 1] S is a distribution over S if µ1 T = 1. For s ∈ S we write e s for the (Dirac) distribution over S with e s (s) = 1 and e s (t) = 0 for t ∈ S \ {s}. We view elements of R S×S as matrices. A matrix M ∈ [0, 1] S×S is called stochastic if each row sums up to one, i.e., M 1 T = 1 T .
For a finite alphabet Σ, we write Σ * and Σ ω for the finite and infinite words over Σ, respectively. We write ε for the empty word. We represent languages L ⊆ Σ ω using deterministic finite automata, and we represent probability measures Pr over Σ ω using Markov chains.
A (discrete-time, finite-state, labelled) Markov chain (MC) is a quadruple (S, Σ, M, s 0 ) where S is a finite set of states, Σ a finite alphabet, s 0 an initial state, and M : Σ → [0, 1] S×S specifies the transitions, such that a∈Σ M (a) is a stochastic matrix. Intuitively, if the MC is in state s, then with probability M (a)(s, s ) it emits a and moves to state s . For the complexity results in this paper, we assume that all numbers in the matrices M (a) for a ∈ Σ are rationals given as fractions of integers represented in binary. We extend M to the mapping M : Σ * → [0, 1] S×S with M (a 1 · · · a k ) = M (a 1 ) · · · M (a k ) for a 1 , . . . , a k ∈ Σ. Intuitively, if the MC is in state s then with probability M (u)(s, s ) it emits the word u ∈ Σ * and moves (in |u| steps) to state s . An MC is called non-hidden if for each a ∈ Σ all non-zero entries of M (a) are in the same column. Intuitively, in a non-hidden MC, the emitted letter identifies the next state. An MC (S, Σ, M, s 0 ) defines the standard probability measure Pr over Σ ω , uniquely defined by assigning probabilities to cylinder sets {u}Σ ω , with u ∈ Σ * , as follows:
Pr({u}Σ ω ) := e s0 M (u)1 T A deterministic finite automaton (DFA) is a quintuple (Q, Σ, δ, q 0 , F ) where Q is a finite set of states, Σ a finite alphabet, δ : Q × Σ → Q a transition function, q 0 an initial state, and F ⊆ Q a set of accepting states. We extend δ to δ : Q × Σ * → Q as usual. A DFA defines a language L ⊆ Σ ω as follows:
L := { w ∈ Σ ω | δ(q 0 , u) ∈ F for some prefix u of w } Note that we do not require accepting states to be visited infinitely often: just once suffices. Therefore we can and will assume without loss of generality that there is f with F = {f } and δ(f, a) = f for all a ∈ Σ. For the rest of the paper we fix an MC M = (S, Σ, M, s 0 ) and a DFA A = (Q, Σ, δ, q 0 , F ). We define their composition as the MC M × A := (S × Q, Σ, M , (s 0 , q 0 )) where M (a) ((s, q) , (s , q )) equals M (a)(s, s ) if q = δ(q, a) and 0 otherwise. Thus, M and M × A induce the same probability measure Pr.
An observation o ∈ Σ ⊥ is either a letter or the special symbol ⊥ ∈ Σ, which stands for 'not seen'. An observation policy ρ : Σ sure that eventually a deciding prefix is reached, then we say υ is confused; if it is almost sure that a deciding prefix will not be reached, then we say υ is very confused; if it is almost sure that eventually a deciding or very confused prefix is reached, then we say υ is finitary. To say this formally, let us make a few notational conventions: for an observation prefix υ, we write Pr(υ) as a shorthand for Pr({ uw | u ∼ υ }); for a set Υ of observation prefixes, we write Pr(Υ) as a shorthand for Pr υ∈Υ { uw | u ∼ υ } . With these conventions, we define: 1. υ is confused when Pr({ υu | υu deciding }) < Pr(υ) 2. υ is very confused when Pr({ υu | υu deciding }) = 0 3. υ is finitary when Pr({ υu | υu deciding or very confused }) = Pr(υ) Observe that (a) confused implies enabled, (b) deciding implies not confused, and (c) enabled and very confused implies confused. The following are alternative equivalent definitions: 1. υ is confused when Pr({ uw | u ∼ υ, no prefix of υw is deciding }) > 0 2. υ is very confused when υu is non-deciding for all enabled υu 3. υ is finitary when Pr({uw | u ∼ υ, no prefix of υw is deciding or very confused}) = 0 Example 2. Consider the MC and the DFA depicted here: All observation prefixes that do not start with b are enabled. The observation prefixes ab and ⊥b and, in fact, all observation prefixes that contain b, are positively deciding. For all n ∈ N we have Pr({w a n | w ∈ L}) > 0 and Pr({w a n | w ∈ L}) > 0, so a n is not deciding. If the MC takes the right transition first then almost surely it emits b at some point. Thus Pr({aaa · · · }) = 1 2 . Hence ε is confused. In this example only non-enabled observation prefixes are very confused. It follows that ε is not finitary.
Beliefs.
For any s we write Pr s for the probability measure of the MC M s obtained from M by making s the initial state. For any q we write L q ⊆ Σ ω for the language of the DFA A q obtained from A by making q the initial state. We call a pair (s, q) negatively deciding when Pr s (L q ) = 0; similarly, we call (s, q) positively deciding when Pr s (L q ) = 1. A subset of S × Q is called belief. We call a belief negatively (positively, respectively) deciding when all its elements are. We fix the notation B 0 := {(s 0 , q 0 )} (for the initial belief ) for the remainder of the paper. Define the belief NFA as the NFA B = (S × Q, Σ ⊥ , ∆, B 0 , ∅) with:
We extend the transition function ∆ : Example 3. In Example 2 we have B 0 = {(s 0 , q 0 )}, and ∆(B 0 , a n ) = {(s 1 , q 0 ), (s 2 , q 0 )} for all n ≥ 1, and ∆(B 0 , b) = ∅, and ∆(B 0 , a⊥) = {(s 1 , q 0 ), (s 2 , q 0 ), (s 2 , f )}, and ∆(B 0 , ⊥υ) = {(s 2 , f )} for all υ that contain b. The latter belief {(s 2 , f )} is positively deciding. We have Pr s1 ({uw | ∆({(s 1 , q 0 )}, u) is deciding}) = 0, so any belief that contains (s 1 , q 0 ) is confused. Also, B 0 is confused as Pr s0 ({uw | ∆({(s 0 , q 0 )}, u) is deciding}) = Proof sketch. The belief NFA B and the MC M × A can be computed in polynomial time (even in deterministic logspace). For items 1-3, there are efficient graph algorithms that search these product structures. For instance, to show that a given pair (s 1 , q 1 ) is not negatively deciding, it suffices to show that B has a path from (s 1 , q 1 ) to a state (s 2 , f ) for some s 2 . This can be checked in polynomial time (even in NL).
For items 4-6, one searches the (exponential-sized) product of M and the determinization of B. This can be done in PSPACE. For instance, to show that a given belief B is confused, it suffices to show that there are (s 1 , q 1 ) ∈ B and u 1 and s 2 such that M has a u 1 -labelled path from s 1 to s 2 such that there do not exist u 2 and s 3 such that M has a u 2 -labelled path from s 2 to s 3 such that ∆(B, u 1 u 2 ) is deciding. This can be checked in NPSPACE = PSPACE by nondeterministically guessing paths in the product of M and the determinization of B.
Diagnosability.
We call a policy a diagnoser when it decides almost surely.
Example 6. In Example 2 a diagnoser does not exist. Indeed, the policy • does not decide when the MC takes the left transition, and decides (positively) almost surely when the MC takes the right transition in the first step. Hence Pr({w | • decides w}) = Pr(Σ * {b}Σ ω ) = Diagnosability can be characterized by the notion of confusion:
Proposition 7. There exists a diagnoser if and only if ε is not confused.
The following proposition shows that diagnosability is hard to check. Theorem 8 essentially follows from a result by Bertrand et al. [4] . They study several different notions of diagnosability; one of them (FA-diagnosability) is very similar to our notion of diagnosability. There are several small differences; e.g., their systems are not necessarily products of an MC and a DFA. Therefore we give a self-contained proof of Theorem 8.
Proof sketch. By Proposition 7 it suffices to show PSPACE-completeness of checking whether ε is confused. Membership in PSPACE follows from Lemma 5.4. For hardness we reduce from the following problem: given an NFA U over Σ = {a, b} where all states are initial and accepting, does U accept all (finite) words? This problem is PSPACE-complete [16, Lemma 6].
Allowing Confusion.
We say an observation policy allows confusion when, with positive probability, it produces an observation prefix υ⊥ such that υ⊥ is confused but υ is not.
Proposition 9. A feasible observation policy does not allow confusion.
Hence, in order to be feasible, a policy must observe when it would get confused otherwise. In § 5 we show that in the non-hidden case there is almost a converse of Proposition 9; i.e., in order to be feasible, a policy need not do much more than not allow confusion.
Analyzing the Cost of Decision
In this section we study the computational complexity of finding feasible policies that minimize the expected cost of decision. We focus on the decision version of the problem: Is there a feasible policy whose expected cost is smaller than a given threshold? Define:
Since the see-all policy • never stops observing, we have Pr(
However, once an observation prefix υ is deciding or very confused, there is no point in continuing observation. Hence, we define a light see-all policy •, which observes until the observation prefix u is deciding or very confused; formally, •(υ) = 0 if and only if υ is deciding or very confused. It follows from the definition of very confused that the policy • is feasible.
Concerning the cost C • we have for all w
where D n (w) = 1 if the length-n prefix of w is deciding or very confused, and D n (w) = 0 otherwise. The following results are proved in the appendix: Lemma 10 holds because, in M × A, a bottom strongly connected component is reached in expected finite time. Lemma 11 says that a kind of converse holds for feasible policies. Proposition 12 follows from Lemmas 10 and 11. Proposition 13 follows from Propositions 7 and 12. To show Theorem 14, we use Proposition 12 and adapt the proof of Theorem 8.
The main negative result of the paper is that one cannot compute c inf :
Theorem 15. It is undecidable to check if c inf < 3, even when a diagnoser exists.
Proof sketch. By a reduction from the undecidable problem whether a given probabilistic automaton accepts some word with probability > 1 2 . The proof is somewhat complicated. In fact, in the appendix we give two versions of the proof: a short incorrect one (with the correct main idea) and a long correct one.
5
The Non-Hidden Case
Now we turn to positive results. In the rest of the paper we assume that the MC M is non-hidden, i.e., there exists a function
We extend − → · to finite words so that − → ua = − → a . We write s u − → to indicate that there is s with M (u)(s, s ) > 0.
Example 16. Consider the following non-hidden MC and DFA: We will show that in the non-hidden case there always exists a diagnoser (Lemma 23). It follows that feasible policies need to decide almost surely and, by Proposition 13, that c inf is finite. We have seen in Proposition 9 that feasible policies do not allow confusion. In this section we construct policies that procrastinate so much that they avoid confusion just barely.
We will see that such policies have an expected cost that comes arbitrarily close to c inf .
Language Equivalence.
We characterize confusion by language equivalence in a certain DFA. Consider the belief NFA B. In the non-hidden case, if we disallow ⊥-transitions then B becomes a DFA B . For B we define a set of accepting states by
Example 17. For the previous example, a part of the DFA B looks as follows:
States that are unreachable from ( − → a , q 0 ) are not drawn here.
We associate with each (s, q) the language L s,q ⊆ Σ * that B accepts starting from initial state (s, q).
Lemma 18. One can compute the relation ≈ in polynomial time.
Proof. For any (s, q) one can use standard MC algorithms to check in polynomial time if Pr s (L q ) = 1 (using a graph search in the composition M × A, as in the proof of Lemma 5.3). Language equivalence in the DFA B can be computed in polynomial time by minimization.
We call a belief B ⊆ S × Q settled when all (s, q) ∈ B are language equivalent.
Lemma 19. A belief B ⊆ S × Q is confused if and only if there is
It follows that one can check in polynomial time whether a given belief is confused. We generalize this fact in Lemma 22 below. 
, by Lemma 19, the belief B 2 is confused.
Procrastination.
For a belief B ⊆ S × Q and k ∈ N, if ∆(B, ⊥ k ) is confused then so is ∆(B, ⊥ k+1 ). We define:
We set cras(B) := −1 if B is confused. We may write cras(s, q) for cras({(s, q)}).
Example 21. In Example 16 we have cras(B 0 ) = cras( − → a , q 0 ) = 1 and cras(B 1 ) = 0 and 
This holds if and only if there is B 2 ⊆ B with |B 2 | ≤ 2 such that:
Let G be the directed graph with nodes in S × Q × S × Q and edges ((s, q, t, r) , (s , q , t , r ) )
Also define the following set of nodes:
By Lemma 18 one can compute U in polynomial time. It follows from the argument above that ∆(B, ⊥ k ) is confused if and only if there are (s, q), (t, r) ∈ B such that there is a length-k path in G from (s, q, t, r) to a node in U . Let k ≤ |S × Q × S × Q| be the length of the shortest such path, and set k := ∞ if no such path exists. Then k can be computed in polynomial time by a search of the graph G, and we have cras(B) = k − 1.
The Procrastination Policy.
For any belief B and any observation prefix υ, the language equivalence classes represented in ∆(B, υ) depend only on υ and the language equivalence classes in B. Therefore, when tracking beliefs along observations, we may restrict B to a single representative of each equivalence class. We denote this operation by B↓. A belief B is settled if and only if |B↓| ≤ 1.
A procrastination policy ρ pro (K) is parameterized with (a large) K ∈ N. Define (and precompute) k(s, q) := min{K, cras(s, q)} for all (s, q). We define ρ pro (K) by the following monitor that implements it:
c. i := i + 1; 3. output yes/no decision It follows from the definition of cras and Lemma 19 that ∆((s i , q i ), υ i )↓ is indeed a singleton for all i. We have:
Proof. For a non-hidden MC M and a DFA A, there is at most one successor for (s, q) on letter a in the belief NFA B, for all s, q, a. Then, by Lemma 19, singleton beliefs are not confused, and in particular the initial belief B 0 is not confused. By Lemma 4.4, ε is not confused, which means that Pr({ u | u deciding }) = Pr(ε) = 1. Since almost surely a deciding word u is produced and since ∆(B 0 , u) ⊆ ∆(B 0 , υ) whenever u ∼ υ, it follows that eventually an observation prefix υ is produced such that ∆(B 0 , υ) contains a deciding pair (s, q). But, as remarked above, ∆(B 0 , υ) is settled, so it is deciding.
The Procrastination MC
The policy ρ pro (K) produces a (random, almost surely finite) word a 1 a 2 · · · a n with n = C ρpro (K) . Indeed, the observations that ρ pro (K) makes can be described by an MC. Recall that we have previously defined a composition
where $ ∈ Σ is a fresh letter and the transitions are as follows: when (s, q) is deciding then M pro (K)($) (s, q), (s, q) := 1, and when (s, q) is not deciding then
where the matrix M (⊥) := a M (a) is powered by k(s, q). The MC M pro (K) may not be non-hidden, but could be made non-hidden by (i) collapsing all language equivalent (s, q 1 ), (s, q 2 ) in the natural way, and (ii) redirecting all $-labelled transition to a new state − → $ that has a self-loop. In the understanding that $$$ · · · indicates 'decision made', the probability distribution defined by the MC M pro (K) coincides with the probability distribution on sequences of non-⊥ observations made by ρ pro (K).
Example 24. For Example 16 the MC M pro (K) for K ≥ 1 is as follows:
Here the lower number in a state indicate the cras number. The left state is negatively deciding, and the right state is positively deciding. The policy ρ pro (K) skips the first observation and then observes either b or a, each with probability 1 2 , each leading to a deciding belief.
Maximal Procrastination is Optimal.
The following lemma states, loosely speaking, that when a belief {(s, q)} with cras(s, q) = ∞ is reached and K is large, then a single further observation is expected to suffice for a decision.
Lemma 25. Let c(K, s, q) denote the expected cost of decision under
Proof sketch. The proof is a quantitative version of the proof of Lemma 23. The singleton belief {(s, q)} is not confused. Thus, if K is large then with high probability the belief B := ∆({(s, q)}, ⊥ K a) (for the observed next letter a) contains a deciding pair (s , q ). But if cras(s, q) = ∞ then, by Lemma 19, B is settled, so if B contains a deciding pair then B is deciding.
Example 26. Consider the following variant of the previous example:
The left state is negatively deciding, and the right state is positively deciding. We have
Now we can prove the main positive result of the paper:
Theorem 27. For any feasible policy ρ there is K ∈ N such that:
Proof sketch. Let ρ be a feasible policy. We choose K > |S| 2 · |Q| 2 , so, by Lemma 22, ρ pro (K) coincides with ρ pro (∞) until time, say, n ∞ when ρ pro (K) encounters a pair (s, q) with cras(s, q) = ∞. (The time n ∞ may, with positive probability, never come.) Let us compare ρ pro (K) with ρ up to time n ∞ . For n ∈ {0, . . . , n ∞ }, define υ pro (n) and υ ρ (n) as the observation prefixes obtained by ρ pro and ρ, respectively, after n steps. Write pro (n) and ρ (n) for the number of non-⊥ observations in υ pro (n) and υ ρ (n), respectively. For beliefs B, B we write B B when for all (s, q) ∈ B there is (s , q ) ∈ B with (s, q) ≈ (s , q ). One can show by induction that we have for all n ∈ {0, . . . , n ∞ }:
If time n ∞ does not come then the inequality pro (n) ≤ ρ (n) from above suffices. Similarly, if at time n ∞ the pair (s, q) is deciding, we are also done. If after time n ∞ the procrastination policy ρ pro (K) observes at least one more letter then ρ also observes at least one more letter. By Lemma 25, one can choose K large so that for ρ pro (K) one additional observation probably suffices. If it is the case that ρ almost surely observes only one letter after n ∞ , then ρ pro (K) also needs only one more observation, since it has observed at time n ∞ .
It follows that, in order to compute c inf , it suffices to analyze Ex(C ρpro(K) ) for large K. This leads to the following theorem: 
By solving the system one can compute c(s 0 , q 0 ) in polynomial time. We have:
Hence one can compute c inf in polynomial time.
Empirical Evaluation of the Expected Optimal Cost
We have shown that maximal procrastination is optimal in the non-hidden case (Theorem 27). However, we have not shown how much better the optimal policy is than the see-all baseline. It appears difficult to answer this question analytically, so we address it empirically. We implemented our algorithms in a fork of the Facebook Infer static analyzer [8] , and applied them to 11 open-source projects, totaling 80 thousand Java methods. We found that in > 90% of cases the maximally procrastinating monitor is trivial and thus the optimal cost is 0, because Infer decides statically if the property is violated. In the remaining cases, we found that the optimal cost is roughly half of the see-all cost, but the variance is high.
Design. Our setting requires a DFA and an MC representing, respectively, a program property and a program. For this empirical estimation of the expected optimal cost, the DFA is fixed, the MC shape is the symbolic flowgraph of a real program, and the MC probabilities are sampled from Dirichlet distributions. The DFA represents the following property: 'there are no two calls to next without an intervening call to hasNext'. To understand how the MC shape is extracted from programs, some background is needed. Infer [8, 9] is a static analyzer that, for each method, infers several preconditions and, attached to each precondition, a symbolic path. For a simple example, consider a method whose body is
Infer would generate two preconditions for it, b and ¬b. In each of the two attached symbolic paths, we can see that next is not called twice, which we would not notice with a control flowgraph. The symbolic paths are inter-procedural. If a method f calls a method g, then the path of f will link to a path of g and, moreover, it will pick one of the paths of g that corresponds to what is currently known at the call site. For example, if g(b) is called from a state in which ¬b holds, then Infer will select a path of g compatible with the condition ¬b.
The symbolic paths are finite because abstraction is applied, including across mutually recursive calls. But, still, multiple vertices of the symbolic path correspond to the same vertex of the control flowgraph. For example, Infer may go around a for-loop five times before noticing the invariant. By coalescing those vertices of the symbolic path that correspond to the same vertex of the control flowgraph we obtain an SFG (symbolic flowgraph). We use such SFGs as the skeleton of MCs. Intuitively, one can think of SFGs as inter-procedural control flowgraphs restricted based on semantic information. Vertices correspond to locations in the program text, and transitions correspond to method calls or returns. Transition probabilities should then be interpreted as a form of static branch prediction. One could learn these probabilities by observing many runs of the program on typical input data, for example by using the Baum-Welch algorithm [17] . Instead, we opt to show that the improvement in expected observation cost is robust over a wide range of possible transition probabilities, which we do by drawing several samples from Dirichlet distributions. Besides, recall that the (optimal) procrastination policy does not depend on transition probabilities.
Once we have a DFA and an MC we compute their product. In some cases, it is clear that the product is empty or universal. These are the cases in which we can give the verdict right away, because no observation is necessary. We then focus on the non-trivial cases.
For non-trivial MC × DFA products, we compute the expected cost of the light see-all policy Ex(C • ), which observes all letters until a decision is made and then stops. We can do so by using standard algorithms [2, Chapter 10.5]. Then, we compute M pro , which we use to compute the expected observation cost c inf of the procrastination policy (Theorem 28). Recall that in order to compute M pro , one needs to compute the cras function, and also to find language equivalence classes. Thus, computing M pro entails computing all the information necessary for implementing a procrastinating monitor.
Methodology. We selected 11 Java projects among those that are most forked on GitHub ( Table 2 ). We ran Infer on each of these projects. From the inferred specifications, we built SFGs and monitors that employ light see-all policies and maximal procrastination policies. From these monitors, we computed the respective expected costs, solving the linear systems using Gurobi [12] . Our implementation is in a fork of Infer, on GitHub. Results. The results are given in Table 1 . We first note that the number of monitors is much smaller than the number of methods, by a factor of 10 or 100. This is because in most cases we are able to determine the answer statically, by analyzing the symbolic paths produced by Infer. The large factor should not be too surprising: we are considering a fixed property about iterators, not all Java methods use iterators, and, when they do, it is usually easy to tell that they do so correctly. Still, each project has a few hundred monitors, which handle the cases that are not so obvious. We note that c inf Ex(C•) ≈ 0.5. The table supports this by presenting the median and the geometric average, which are close to each-other; the arithmetic average is also close. There is, however, quite a bit of variation from monitor to monitor, as shown in Figure 1 . We conclude that selective monitoring has the potential to significantly reduce the overhead of runtime monitoring.
Future Work
In this paper we required policies to be feasible, which means that our selective monitors are as precise as non-selective monitors. One may relax this and study the tradeoff between efficiency (skipping even more observations) and precision (probability of making a decision). Further, one could replace the diagnosability notion of this paper by other notions from the literature; one could investigate how to compute c inf for other classes of MCs, such as acyclic MCs; one could study the sensitivity of c inf to changes in transition probabilities; and one could identify classes of MCs for which selective monitoring helps and classes of MCs for which selective monitoring does not help. A nontrivial extension to the formal model would be to include some notion of data, which is pervasive in practical specification languages used in runtime verification [13] . This would entail replacing the DFA with a more expressive device, such as a nominal automaton [7] , a symbolic automaton [10] , or a logic with data (e.g., [11] ). Alternatively, one could side-step the problem by using the slicing idea [18] , which separates the concern of handling data at the expense of a mild loss of expressive power. Finally, the monitors we computed could be used in a runtime verifier, or even in session type monitoring where the setting is similar [6] . 
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A Experimental Details
B Proofs
B.1 Equivalence of Definitions for Observation Prefixes
Confused. Recall the two definitions for υ confused: 
B.2 Proof of Lemma 4
Here is Lemma 4 from the main body:
Lemma 4. Let υ be an observation prefix. Similarly we have:
υ is enabled if and only if
Further, we have for all B ⊆ S × Q:
We prove item 1:
We prove item 2:
υ is negatively deciding
The proof of item 3 is similar. Towards item 4 note that if υ is not deciding then none of its prefixes is. This property explains the second equivalence in the following proof of item 4. There we write u < w to denote that u is a finite prefix of w.
υ is confused We prove item 5:
υ is very confused ⇐⇒ ∀ u : (υu is enabled → υu is not deciding) definition
The proof of item 6 is similar to the proof of item 4. We abbreviate "not deciding and not very confused" to "continuing". Note that if υ is continuing then all its prefixes are. This property explains the second equivalence in the following proof of item 6. There we write u < w to denote that u is a finite prefix of w.
υ is finitary
This proves item 6 and completes the proof of the lemma.
B.3 Proof of Lemma 5
Here is Lemma 5 from the main body:
Lemma 5. Let υ be an observation prefix, and B a belief.
Whether υ is enabled can be decided in P.
Whether υ (or B) is negatively deciding can be decided in P.
Whether υ (or B) is positively deciding can be decided in P.
Whether υ (or B) is confused can be decided in PSPACE.
Whether υ (or B) is very confused can be decided in PSPACE.
Whether υ (or B) is finitary can be decided in PSPACE.
Proof. Let G be the following graph: the set of vertices is S × Q × P where P is the set of prefixes of υ; there is an edge (s 1 , q 1 , υ 1 ) → (s 2 , q 2 , υ 2 ) if and only if υ 1 = oυ 2 for some o and ∆((s 1 , q 1 ), o) (s 2 , q 2 ). This graph G can be computed in deterministic logspace. Also note that the belief NFA can be computed in deterministic logspace. is not negatively deciding. It follows that one can check in NL whether υ is negatively deciding. The same reasoning applies when "negatively deciding" is replaced with "positively deciding". Therefore, for items 2 and 3, it remains to show that one can determine in NL whether a given pair (s 1 , q 1 ) is negatively (positively, respectively) deciding. We have:
The latter can be checked in NL by nondeterministically guessing a word u letter-by-letter and by nondeterministically following, in the belief NFA, a path that is labelled by u and leads from (s 1 , q 1 ) to a node (s 2 , f ). This proves item 2.
For item 3 it remains to show how to determine in NL whether a given pair (s 1 , q 1 ) is positively deciding. We have:
|u| ≤ |S × Q|
The last equivalence follows from the fact that there are at most |S × Q| different pairs of the form (s, q). Therefore, one can check in NL whether (s 1 , q 1 ) is not positively deciding: 1. nondeterministically guess a word u letter-by-letter; 2. nondeterministically follow, in the belief NFA, a path that is labelled by u and leads from (s 1 , q 1 ) to a node (s 2 , q 2 ); 3. check that (s 2 , q 2 ) is negatively deciding; we have shown previously that this can be done in NL. This proves item 3. 
Proof of item 4.
By Lemma 4.4 it suffices to prove membership in PSPACE for the case where a belief B is given. For all B ⊆ S × Q, define:
We first prove the following claim:
Claim. For given s and B ⊆ S × Q one can determine in PSPACE whether Pr s (V B ) = 0.
We prove the claim. We have:
The last equivalence follows from the fact that there are at most 2 |S×Q| different beliefs of the form ∆(B, u). Therefore, one can check in NPSPACE = PSPACE whether Pr s (V B ) > 0: 1. guess a word u = a 1 · · · a n with n ≤ 2 |S×Q| letter-by-letter and check that there are states s 1 , . . . , s n with M (a 1 )(s, s 1 ) > 0 and M (a i+1 )(s i , s i+1 ) > 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}; 2. compute, on the fly, the belief B := ∆(B, u) = ∆(· · · ∆(∆(B, a 1 ), a 2 ) · · · a n ); 3. check that B is deciding; we have shown in items 2 and 3 that this can be done in polynomial time. Since PSPACE is closed under complement, we have proved the claim.
Towards item 4, let B be any belief. We have:
The last equivalence follows from the fact that there are at most |S| · 2 |S×Q| different pairs of the form (s , ∆(B, u) ). Therefore, one can check in NPSPACE = PSPACE whether B is confused: 1. guess a word u = a 1 · · · a n with n ≤ |S| · 2 |S×Q| letter-by-letter and check that there are states s 1 , . . . , s n with M (a 1 )(s, s 1 ) > 0 and M (a i+1 )(s i , s i+1 ) > 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n−1}; 2. compute, on the fly, the belief B := ∆(B, u) = ∆(· · · ∆ (∆(B, a 1 ) , a 2 ) · · · a n ); 3. check that Pr sn (V B ) = 0; we have shown in the claim above that this can be done in PSPACE.
Proof of item 5.
By Lemma 4.5 it suffices to prove membership in PSPACE for the case where a belief B is given. We have:
B is not very confused The last equivalence follows from the fact that there are at most 2 |S×Q| different beliefs of the form ∆(B, u). Therefore, one can check in NPSPACE = PSPACE whether B is not very confused: 1. guess a word u with |u| ≤ 2 |S×Q| letter-by-letter and compute, on the fly, the belief B := ∆ (B, u) ; 2. check that B = ∅ and B is deciding; we have shown in items 2 and 3 that this can be done in polynomial time. Since PSPACE is closed under complement, we have proved item 5.
Proof of item 6.
By Lemma 4.6 it suffices to prove membership in PSPACE for the case where a belief B is given. The proof is analogous to the one of item 4. We abbreviate "deciding or very confused" to "dv". For all B ⊆ S × Q, define:
Claim. For given s and B ⊆ S × Q one can determine in PSPACE whether Pr s (W B ) = 0.
The last equivalence follows from the fact that there are at most 2 |S×Q| different beliefs of the form ∆(B, u). Therefore, one can check in NPSPACE = PSPACE whether Pr s (W B ) > 0: 1. guess a word u = a 1 · · · a n with n ≤ 2 |S×Q| letter-by-letter and check that there are states s 1 , . . . , s n with M (a 1 )(s, s 1 ) > 0 and M (a i+1 )(s i , s i+1 ) > 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}; 2. compute, on the fly, the belief B := ∆(B, u) = ∆(· · · ∆ (∆(B, a 1 ) , a 2 ) · · · a n ); 3. check that B is dv; we have shown in items 2, 3 and 5 that this can be done in PSPACE. Since PSPACE is closed under complement, we have proved the claim.
Towards item 6, let B be any belief. We have:
The last equivalence follows from the fact that there are at most |S| · 2 |S×Q| different pairs of the form (s , ∆(B, u) ). Therefore, one can check in NPSPACE = PSPACE whether B is not finitary: 1. guess a word u = a 1 · · · a n with n ≤ |S| · 2 |S×Q| letter-by-letter and check that there are states s 1 , . . . , s n with M (a 1 )(s, s 1 ) > 0 and M (a i+1 )(s i , s i+1 ) > 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n−1}; 2. compute, on the fly, the belief B := ∆(B, u) = ∆(· · · ∆ (∆(B, a 1 ) , a 2 ) · · · a n ); 3. check that Pr sn (W B ) = 0; we have shown in the claim above that this can be done in PSPACE. Since PSPACE is closed under complement, we have proved item 6. 
B.4 Proof of Proposition 7
Here is Proposition 7 from the main body: 
B.5 Proof of Theorem 8
Here is Theorem 8 from the main body:
Theorem 8 (cf. [4, Theorem 6]). Given an MC M and a DFA A, it is PSPACE-complete to check if there exists a diagnoser.
Proof. By Proposition 7 it suffices to show PSPACE-completeness of checking whether ε is confused. Membership in PSPACE follows from Lemma 5.4.
For hardness we reduce from the following problem: given an NFA U over Σ = {a, b} where all states are initial and accepting, does U accept all (finite) words? This problem is PSPACE-complete [16, Lemma 6]. Let U = (Q, Σ, δ, Q, Q) be the given NFA. We construct an MC M = (Q ∪ {s 0 , s 1 , s 2 }, Σ ∪ {#}, M, s 0 ) where s 0 , s 1 , s 2 ∈ Q, and # ∈ Σ = {a, b}, and the transitions are as follows:
In this picture, the rectangle labelled with Q indicates states and transitions that involve the states in Q, i.e., those coming from the NFA U. In more detail we define:
x(q) for all q ∈ Q and both σ ∈ {a, b} and all q ∈ δ(q, σ); M (#)(q, s 2 ) := 1 x(q) for all q ∈ Q. Define A to be a DFA that accepts L = Σ * {#}(Σ ∪ {#}) * . We show that ε is confused if and only if U accepts all words.
Suppose U does not accept the word u ∈ Σ * . Then one of the following two events happens almost surely, depending on whether M takes the left or the right transition in the first step:
M emits au 0 # for some u 0 ∈ Σ * ;
M emits au 0 u for some u 0 ∈ Σ * .
We claim that both au 0 # and au 0 u are deciding, implying that ε is not confused. It is clear that au 0 # is positively deciding. We argue that au 0 u is negatively deciding. Indeed, since U does not accept u, we have δ(q, u) = ∅ for all q ∈ Q. Hence, starting from any q ∈ Q, the MC M cannot emit u. So if M emits au 0 u, it must have taken the right transition in the first step and thus will never emit #, which means that au 0 u is negatively deciding. Conversely, suppose that ε is not confused. Then, almost surely, M emits a deciding prefix u . By our construction, the word u is positively deciding with probability 1 2 , and negatively deciding with probability 1 2 (depending on which transition M takes in the first step). Hence there exists u ∈ Σ * such that au is negatively deciding. So M cannot take the left transition in the first step and then emit u. It follows that there is no q ∈ Q with δ(q, u) = ∅, i.e., U does not accept u.
B.6 Proof of Proposition 9
Here is Proposition 9 from the main body:
Proposition 9. A feasible observation policy does not allow confusion.
Proof. Suppose that ρ allows confusion, i.e., with positive probability, it produces an observation prefix υ⊥ such that υ⊥ is confused but υ is not. We have:
Thus we have:
Hence ρ is not feasible.
B.7 Proof of Lemma 10
Here is Lemma 10 from the main body:
Proof. We abbreviate "deciding or very confused" to "dv". Note that if a belief B is dv then all ∆(B, a) are dv. We use this to show the following similar property:
Claim. For any finitary belief B, all ∆(B, a) are finitary.
We prove the claim. Let B be a finitary belief. Then we have:
Here, the second equality follows from the property of dv mentioned above. Hence, for all a ∈ Σ and all (s , q ) ∈ ∆(B, a) we have Pr s ({uw | ∆(B, au) is dv}) = 1, so ∆(B, a) is finitary for all a. This proves the claim. Define:
For any belief B define:
For any (s, B) ∈ F and any n ∈ N define
where by Ex s we denote the expectation with respect to Pr s and we define D B,n (w) := e dv (∆(B, u n )) where u n is the length-n prefix of w. We have c 0 (s, B) = 1 − e dv (B). Further, due to the claim above, we have for all n ∈ N:
We may write those equations in vector form:
where e dv ∈ {0, 1} F where e dv (s, B) = e dv (B) as in (6); c n ∈ R F where c n (s, B) is as in (7);
By a straightforward induction it follows:
From the definition of finitary, for all (s, B) ∈ F there is u such that Pr s ({u}Σ ω ) > 0 and ∆(B, u) is dv. It follows that there is n ∈ N such that
T where the inequality is strict in all entries. By (9), we have U n 1 T < 1 T where the inequality is strict in all entries. Hence the spectral radius of U is less than one, and so the matrix series ∞ n=0 U n converges to a finite matrix, say U * ∈ R F ×F . Suppose ε is finitary. By Lemma 4.6, the belief B 0 = ∆(B 0 , ε) is finitary. Hence (s 0 , B 0 ) ∈ F. Further we have:
This completes the proof.
B.8 Proof of Lemma 11
Here is Lemma 11 from the main body:
Proof. Let ρ be an observation policy. Suppose ε is not finitary and Pr(C ρ < ∞) = 1. We show that ρ is not feasible.
Observe that for any w, if C ρ (w) < ∞ then there is a (unique) shortest finite prefix of w, sayũ(w), such that ρ never observes a letter afterũ(w). Abbreviating "deciding or very confused" to "dv", we have:
It follows that there is u that is (i) not deciding, (ii) not very confused, and (iii) such that ρ never observes a letter after u. Since u is not very confused, there is u such that uu is enabled and deciding. Hence • decides all words of the form uu w. Since ρ never observes a letter after u, we have that ρ does not decide any words of the form uu w. 
B.9 Proof of Proposition 12
Here is Proposition 12 from the main body:
Proposition 12. c inf is finite if and only if ε is finitary.
Proof. Suppose ε is finitary. By Lemma 10 we then have that Ex(C • ) is finite. Hence c inf ≤ Ex(C • ) is finite. Conversely, suppose ε is not finitary. By Lemma 11 we then have Pr(C ρ = ∞) > 0 for all feasible observation policies. Thus Ex(C ρ ) = ∞ holds for all feasible observation policies. Hence c inf = ∞.
B.10 Proof of Proposition 13
Here is Proposition 13 from the main body: 
B.11 Proof of Theorem 14
Here is Theorem 14 from the main body:
Proof. By Proposition 12 it suffices to show PSPACE-completeness of checking whether ε is finitary. Membership in PSPACE follows from Lemma 5.6. For hardness we use the same reduction as in the proof of Theorem 8. There we reduce from the following PSPACE-complete problem: given an NFA U over Σ = {a, b} where all states are initial and accepting, does U accept all (finite) words? The reduction produces an MC M and a DFA A.
First we show that in the result of that reduction, no enabled word is very confused. If a word u contains the letter # then u is negatively deciding, hence not very confused. Let u 0 ∈ Σ * .
If the NFA U accepts all words then au 0 # is enabled and positively deciding;
if B does not accept some word u then au 0 u is enabled and negatively deciding. In either case it follows that au 0 is not very confused and also that ε is not very confused. We conclude that no enabled word is very confused. 
B.12 Wrong Proof of Theorem 15
Here is Theorem 15 from the main body:
First we give a wrong proof. This proof contains useful ideas and is similar to and simpler than the correct one, but is flawed. We point out the flaw. In § B.13 we amend the proof, making it more complicated but correct. The incorrect proof contains only ideas that feature also in the correct one; but the correct proof can be read without having read the incorrect one.
Wrong proof. We reduce from the emptiness problem for probabilistic automata. A probabilistic automaton (PA) is a tuple P = (S, Σ, M, s 0 , η) where S is a finite set of states, Σ is a finite alphabet, the mapping M : Σ → [0, 1] S×S , where M (a) is stochastic for each a ∈ Σ, specifies the transitions, s 0 is an initial state, and η ∈ [0, 1] S is a vector of acceptance probabilities. Extend M to M : Σ * → [0, 1] S×S as in the case of MCs. In the case of PAs, M (u) is stochastic for each u ∈ Σ * . For each u define Pr P (u) := e s0 M (u)η . The probability Pr P (u) can be interpreted as the probability that P accepts u. The emptiness problem asks, given a PA P, whether there is u such that Pr P (u) > 1 2 . This problem is undecidable [?, p. 190, Theorem 6.17] .
Let P = (S P , Σ P , M P , s 0P , η) be the given PA. We will construct a DFA A and an MC M over the alphabet Σ := Σ P ∪ {0, 1, ?}, where 0, 1, ? are fresh letters. Define A to be a DFA that accepts L = 0(ΣΣ) * Σ1Σ ω . We might characterize L by saying that 1 appears on an odd position.
We construct an MC M = (S, Σ, M, s 0 ) with
such that s 0 is a fresh state. The MC M initially splits randomly into a "0-copy" (with states in S × {0, 2}) and a "1-copy" (with states in S × {1, 3}), in either case emitting the letter 0. Formally,
The MC M is constructed such that if it goes into the 0-copy then surely it emits an infinite word that is not in L; and if it goes into the 1-copy then almost surely it emits an infinite word in L. Therefore, for an observation policy it suffices to identify which copy M has entered.
The transitions in M depend on M P and η. In Figure 2 we illustrate this dependence with an example, where Σ P = {a, b}. For all s, t ∈ S P and both i ∈ {0, 1} we have the (s, 0) (s, 2)
Figure 2 Illustration of the wrong reduction. The PA at the top has a state s whose outgoing transitions are such that M (a)(s, t1) =
. The resulting MC has two corresponding states, (s, 0) and (s, 1). From such a state (s, i) it first emits, with a probability depending on η(s), either the letter i (thus giving away in which copy the MC is) or the letter ?, and then emits, with probability 1 3 , the letter i (thus giving away in which copy the MC is), or, with probability in the next round we believe to be in a state (s, i) with high η(s). Now it might be beneficial to make another non-ρ observation, even if Pr P (u 0 a) ≤ 1 2 holds for all a ∈ Σ P . To fix this problem we need to change the construction in a way that a single deviation from ρ leaks less information. We do this in the following § B.13.
B.13 Correct Proof of Theorem 15
Proof. We reduce from the emptiness problem for probabilistic automata. A probabilistic automaton (PA) is a tuple P = (S, Σ, M, s 0 , η) where S is a finite set of states, Σ is a finite alphabet, the mapping M : Σ → [0, 1] S×S , where M (a) is stochastic for each a ∈ Σ, specifies the transitions, s 0 is an initial state, and η ∈ [0, 1]
S is a vector of acceptance probabilities.
S×S as in the case of MCs. In the case of PAs, M (u) is stochastic for each u ∈ Σ * . For each u define Pr P (u) := e s0 M (u)η . The probability Pr P (u) can be interpreted as the probability that P accepts u. The emptiness problem asks, given a PA P, whether there is u such that Pr P (u) > 1 2 . This problem is undecidable [?, p. 190, Theorem 6.17] .
We assume that for all u there is s with M (u)(s 0 , s) > 0 and 0 < η(s) < 1. This is without loss of generality, as we can make the PA branch, in its first transition and with positive probability, to a sub-PA with a single state from which every word is accepted with probability Let P = (S P , Σ P , M P , s 0P , η) be the given PA. We will construct a DFA A and an MC M over the alphabet Σ := Σ P ∪ {0, 1}, where 0, 1 are fresh letters. Define A to be a DFA that accepts L = 0(ΣΣΣΣΣ) * ΣΣΣΣ1Σ ω . Ignoring the very first letter 0, we might characterize L by saying that 1 appears on a position that is divisible by 5.
such that s 0 and the states inS are fresh states. The MC M initially splits randomly into a "0-copy" (with states in S × {0, 2}) and a "1-copy" (with states in S × {1, 3}), in either case emitting the letter 0. Formally,
The transitions in M depend on M P and η. In Figure 3 we illustrate this dependence with an example, where Σ P = {a, b}. Figure 3 Illustration of the reduction. The PA at the top has a state s whose outgoing transitions
. The resulting MC has two corresponding states, (s, 0) and (s, 1). From such a state (s, i) it first emits, with a probability depending on η(s), a 4-bit sequence ("block"), and then emits, with probability 1 3 , the letter i (thus giving away in which copy the MC is), or, with probability if they agree then the observation prefix has become deciding, so stop observing; if they do not agree, observe also the next two letters; this produces a deciding prefix, so stop observing. This policy coincides mostly with the diagnoser ρ described above. It only deviates if and when u 0 has been observed. We show that this deviation improves the expected cost.
To argue in more formal terms, we extend (for the PA P) the mapping
One can view the distribution µ P (υ) as the expected distribution after having fed the PA P with a randomly sampled u ∼ υ. Similarly, we extend (for the MC M) the mapping
One can view the distribution µ(υ) as the expected distribution after having observed υ. Finally, for any finite word
* define the following padding:
With these definitions, it is straightforward to check that we have:
For the word u 0 from above we have µ P (u 0 )η T = Pr P (u 0 ) > 1 2 . It follows from (11) and (10) that, conditioned under prefix u 0 , the conditional probability of emitting 00 or 11 at the beginning of the following block is greater than 1 2 ; formally:
Recall that ρ 0 is defined so that once it has observed u 0 , it makes either exactly 2 or exactly 4 further observations. From the previous inequality it follows for ρ 0 that, conditioned under observing u 0 , the conditional probability to make exactly 2 further observations is greater than the conditional probability to make exactly 4 further observations. Hence, the conditional expected number of observations after having observed u 0 is less than 3. More formally, for any policy ρ and an observation prefix It remains to show the converse. To this end, suppose all u satisfy Pr P (u) ≤ 1 2 . It suffices to show that all feasible policies ρ satisfy Ex(C ρ ) ≥ 3.
In the following we use regular expressions to describe observation prefixes. For improved readability we may indicate the borders of a block with a dot. For instance, the regular expression ⊥(.⊥ 4 .(Σ P + ⊥)) * .0⊥⊥⊥.
indicates observation prefixes of the following form: first all observations (if any) are made in non-blocks and are in Σ P (i.e., are not 0 or 1), and then 0 is observed at the beginning of a block, and the other three letters in the block are not observed. We call k ∈ (0 + 1 + ⊥) 4 block-deciding when k ∈ (0 + 1) 4 + (00 + 11)(0 + 1 + ⊥) 2 . We have the following lemma:
Lemma 29. Let υ be an observation prefix that is not deciding and satisfies |υ| = 1 + 5n for some n ∈ N. Let k ∈ (0 + 1 + ⊥)
4 . Then υ.k. is deciding if and only if k is block-deciding.
Proof of the lemma. Let υ and k be as in the statement. Suppose k is block-deciding. Then, by inspecting (10), it follows that υ.k. is deciding. Conversely, suppose k is not block-deciding. From the assumption made about P in the beginning we obtain that there is s ∈ S P with 0 < η(s) < 1 such that M (υ)(s 0 , (s, 0)) > 0 and M (υ)(s 0 , (s, 1)) > 0. By inspecting (10), it follows that υ.k. is not deciding.
Let ρ be any feasible policy, and let υ be an observation prefix that ρ produces with positive probability. 4 is not block-deciding. Similarly as before, it follows that υ is not deciding.
Suppose the next observation that ρ makes is in a block. Then, by item 1, we have Ex(C υ ρ ) ≥ 1 + 1 = 2. Otherwise the next observation is in a non-block. If this observation yields 0 or 1 (which happens with probability 1 3 ) then no further observation is needed; otherwise, the resulting observation prefix will have the form from item 2. It follows from item 2 that Ex(C Otherwise the next observation follows immediately and yields b ∈ {0, 1}. The word ⊥⊥bb is not block-deciding, hence, by Lemma 29, υb is not deciding, so Ex(C υ ρ ) ≥ 2. Thus, in either case we have Ex(C υ ρ ) ≥ 2. 5. Suppose υ ∈ ⊥(.⊥ 4 .(Σ P + ⊥)) * .bb for bb ∈ (0 + 1 + ⊥) 2 and bb ∈ 00 + 11. Then υ is not deciding.
Suppose the next observation is not in the same block. Then the resulting observation prefix has the form from either item 1 or item 2. It follows from these items that Ex(C * with υ 0 = υ 1 . Since all u ∈ Σ * P satisfy µ P (u)η T = Pr P (u) ≤ 1 2 , we also have µ P (υ 1 )η T ≤ 1 2 . It follows from (11) and (10) that, conditioned under prefix υ 0 , the conditional probability of emitting 00 or 11 is at most 1 2 ; formally:
For symmetry reasons we must have:
In words, the conditional probability that the next observation equals b is at most 1 2 . If this happens then no further observation is needed, as bb⊥⊥ is block-deciding; otherwise, the resulting observation prefix has the form from item 5. It follows from item 5 that Ex(C Let ρ be feasible. Call an observation prefix υ conventional when υ is not deciding; ρ produces υ with positive probability; and υ does not contain observations in blocks. Towards a contradiction, assume that Ex(C ρ ) < 3. Then there exist a conventional observation prefix υ and x > 0 such that: Ex(C 
